Safety Models

These models and simulations have been tagged “Safety”.

WIP based on Emery Roe's 2013  book . See also Dynamics in Action  IM-3239  for more on behavior and The Art of the State  IM-11962  for more on Grid-Group Cultural Theory
WIP based on Emery Roe's 2013 book. See also Dynamics in Action IM-3239 for more on behavior and The Art of the State IM-11962 for more on Grid-Group Cultural Theory
Grid-Group Culture applied to Public Management WIP based on Christopher Hood's 1998 book. plus excerpts from Schwartz and Thompson's 1990 Book Divided we stand. See also Managing Mess  IM-11581  and FourCultures  Blog  and  Wikipedia Cultural Theory of Risk
Grid-Group Culture applied to Public Management WIP based on Christopher Hood's 1998 book. plus excerpts from Schwartz and Thompson's 1990 Book Divided we stand. See also Managing Mess IM-11581 and FourCultures Blog and Wikipedia Cultural Theory of Risk
From PLOS One  Article  April 2012 Worni, M et al System Dynamics to Model the Unintended Consequences of Denying Payment for Venous Thromboembolism after Total Knee Arthroplasty
From PLOS One Article April 2012 Worni, M et al System Dynamics to Model the Unintended Consequences of Denying Payment for Venous Thromboembolism after Total Knee Arthroplasty
Any and every organization that performs tasks or activities at risk is a system with emergent behavior of a Quality & Safety Culture. There is never a zero state of culture, as every risk or potential risk is met with risk assessment and response through the interactions of the stakeholders.
Any and every organization that performs tasks or activities at risk is a system with emergent behavior of a Quality & Safety Culture. There is never a zero state of culture, as every risk or potential risk is met with risk assessment and response through the interactions of the stakeholders.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
 Addition of Incident Reporting and Prevention Interventions to a simple error chain of medication errors for patients in hospital  IM-10113  

Addition of Incident Reporting and Prevention Interventions to a simple error chain of medication errors for patients in hospital IM-10113 

 Potential Diagnostic Error flows based on Schiff's Diagnostic Error Categories

Potential Diagnostic Error flows based on Schiff's Diagnostic Error Categories

 A simple error chain of medication errors for patients in hospital. Serious medication errors in inpatients with drug orders sometimes result in Adverse Drug Events (ADE) and Deaths. See next  IM-646

A simple error chain of medication errors for patients in hospital. Serious medication errors in inpatients with drug orders sometimes result in Adverse Drug Events (ADE) and Deaths. See next IM-646

Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Model describes influences different variables on Lessons Learned from Acc/Incidents to maximise "Learning from Incidents" so as to prevent accidents.
Any and every organization that performs tasks or activities at risk is a system with emergent behavior of a Quality & Safety Culture. There is never a zero state of culture, as every risk or potential risk is met with risk assessment and response through the interactions of the stakeholders.  T
Any and every organization that performs tasks or activities at risk is a system with emergent behavior of a Quality & Safety Culture. There is never a zero state of culture, as every risk or potential risk is met with risk assessment and response through the interactions of the stakeholders. This version extends the model for the Thinking Systemically Session of STIACP.
Rich picture version of causal loop diagram for medication errors, showing the importance of reporting, analyzing and fixing knowledge and process errors. Medication errors will tend to grow due to the use of more medications in more complex patients. This is exacerbated by the loss of staff knowled
Rich picture version of causal loop diagram for medication errors, showing the importance of reporting, analyzing and fixing knowledge and process errors. Medication errors will tend to grow due to the use of more medications in more complex patients. This is exacerbated by the loss of staff knowledge by turnover and goal erosion in places with harmful errors.
 Rich picture version of causal loop diagram for medication errors, showing the importance of reporting, analyzing and fixing knowledge and process errors. Medication errors will tend to grow due to the use of more medications in more complex patients. This is exacerbated by the loss of staff knowle

Rich picture version of causal loop diagram for medication errors, showing the importance of reporting, analyzing and fixing knowledge and process errors. Medication errors will tend to grow due to the use of more medications in more complex patients. This is exacerbated by the loss of staff knowledge by turnover and goal erosion in places with harmful errors.

Rich picture version of causal loop diagram for medication errors, showing the importance of reporting, analyzing and fixing knowledge and process errors. Medication errors will tend to grow due to the use of more medications in more complex patients. This is exacerbated by the loss of staff knowled
Rich picture version of causal loop diagram for medication errors, showing the importance of reporting, analyzing and fixing knowledge and process errors. Medication errors will tend to grow due to the use of more medications in more complex patients. This is exacerbated by the loss of staff knowledge by turnover and goal erosion in places with harmful errors.
WIP ​Book Summary see  blog entry  Also Chuang2009 ISDC P1127 paper, Newman2017 and Edmondson2014 papers
WIP ​Book Summary see blog entry Also Chuang2009 ISDC P1127 paper, Newman2017 and Edmondson2014 papers